High Speed 2 (HS2) was supposed to be a game changer for the UK’s transport network, truly ‘levelling up’ neglected parts of the nation and adding capacity to its already oversubscribed railways – after years of revoked promises, it now stands as a sorry symbol for what has happened to the country’s ambition.
With the prime minister due to make a speech at the Conservative Party Conference today in which it is widely believed he will confirm that the Birmingham to Manchester section of the route will be cancelled, NCE takes a look back at the big steps along the way in the rise and fall of the UK’s flagship megaproject.
January 2009 – Creation of High Speed 2 Ltd
After the successful opening of High Speed 1 (HS1) between London and the Channel Tunnel in 2007, with a £5.8bn investment, it appeared the UK had acquired the taste for high speed rail.
The then-Labour government created High Speed 2 Ltd (HS2 Ltd), a non-departmental government body funded by the Department for Transport (DfT) in January 2009 with the remit of investigating a potential route between London and the West Midlands, with a potential to continue to Scotland.
When HS2 Ltd presented its report to the government at the end of 2009, it included possibilities for links to Heathrow Airport, Crossrail (now the Elizabeth Line), the Great Western Main Line and HS1.
March 2010 – HS2 officially revealed
Transport secretary Lord Adonis made the plans official in March 2010, presenting a potential map very similar to that we see now: a London terminus at Euston, a stop at Old Oak Common, an interchange station near Birmingham airport and a central Birmingham station at Curzon Street. This had a price tag of £15.8bn to £17.4bn and construction was unlikely to start before 2017.
Plans for the Y-shaped network with a westward leg to Manchester and an eastward leg to Leeds via the East Midlands and Sheffield were also in consideration at this point.
Opposition parties showed tentative support for the plans – with Conservative shadow transport secretary Theresa Villiers saying that her party would ensure that work started in 2015 if they were in power.
May 2010 – Conservatives come into power
Upon winning the 2010 general election and coming into power as part of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the new government ordered a review of the HS2 plans it had inherited. The government was keen for the high speed line to serve Heathrow Airport, but this was rejected by HS2 Ltd.
February 2011 – Public consultation
The HS2 plans for a line between London and Birmingham remained more or less unchanged from those inherited from Labour when they went out to public consultation in February 2011. It was also promised that it would connect to HS1. Later additions would see more high-speed lines north of the West Midlands and high speed links to Heathrow.
The consultation attracted the ire of a range of campaign groups.
January 2012 – Green light
Despite the naysaying, HS2 was officially green lit in January 2012 with a promise to deliver the full Y-shaped network with stations in London, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield and the East Midlands. It would be delivered in two phases, starting with Birmingham to London and followed by the arms of the Y.
The government also promised that “High speed trains will also connect seamlessly with the existing West Coast and East Coast main lines to serve passengers beyond the HS2 network in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Newcastle, Durham, York, Darlington, Liverpool, Preston, Wigan and Lancaster”.
The press release also stated that “there are no credible alternatives to a new railway line”.
The first services were expected to start in 2026. The sections from Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds would be operational from 2033.
The plans would had to overcome numerous legal challenges and requests for judicial review in the following years, but was not derailed
October - November 2013 – Preparation bill
The High Speed Rail (Preparation) Bill passed with a huge majority in the House of Commons on 31 October 2013 and after scrutiny in the House of Lords received Royal Assent on 21 November. This released funds for surveys and property purchases along the route.
November 2013 – February 2017 – Hybrid bill for Phase One
The government opted to divide the bills for HS2 into two to reflect the two phases of the project. The High Speed Rail (London to West Midlands) Bill was introduced in November 2013 after the preparation bill passed. This was to grant the government permission to build and maintain HS2 and give it the powers to compulsorily acquire properties or land as needed, among other powers.
It went through nearly three years of parliamentary scrutiny before receiving Royal Assent and becoming law in February 2017.
August 2017 – Main contract awards
£6bn of civil engineering works packages for Phase 1 of HS2 were awarded in August following the hybrid bill’s passing into law.
The four consortia were:
- Skanska Costain Strabag (SCS JV) was awarded the £740M Euston tunnels and the £1bn Northolt Tunnel
- Carillion Eiffage Kier (CEK JV) won the £742M section from the Chilterns to Brackley and the £616M Brackley to Long Itchington Wood packages
- Balfour Beatty Vinci (BBV JV) won the £1.32bn Wood Green to Delta Junction and £1.15bn Delta Junction to West Coast Main Line sections
- Align JV (featuring Bouygues, McAlpine and VolkerFitzpatrick) won the £965M Chiltern Tunnel and Colne Valley Viaduct contract
HS2 Ltd CEO Mark Thurston said at the time: “The contracts we sign today will provide much needed extra capacity and connectivity between our major cities, but it will also unlock huge opportunities for new jobs, homes and economic development and start to rebalance our economy.”
The financial instability of Carillion was known to the government at the time of signing the contracts, with the firm having issued a profit warning three weeks earlier. Transport secretary Chris Grayling said he was assured by partners Kier and Eiffage that it would be able to deliver the contract.
Carillion then went into liquidation in January 2018. The CEK consortium initially became an Eiffage – Kier 50/50 split, but by April 2018 had been bolstered by the additions of Ferrovial and Bam to become EKFB.
June - July 2018 – Civils Delays
The first major speed bump for HS2 came in the summer of 2018 when NCE revealed that HS2 bosses had pushed back the notice to proceed deadline from November 2018 to June 2019. This was to allow the contractors time to cut costs as the estimates were coming in £1bn above target.
The next month the government confirmed the delay, which meant civils work would not start on site until June 2019. At the time, the DfT was still confident that Phase 1 would be delivered on time for 2026 and within budget.
September 2018 – Phase 2b bill delay
The hybrid bill for Phase 2b – Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds – was also pushed back by a year, the government confirmed in September. This was to take account of plans for Northern Powerhouse Rail – another high-speed line connecting the cities of the North that was being developed concurrently.
A DfT spokesperson at the time said: “In order to maximise the huge potential of HS2, it is important to make sure it takes full account of the emerging vision for the other transformative project of Northern Powerhouse Rail.
“Phase 2b of the railway will connect the great cities of the North to boost jobs, housing and economic growth, and remains on track to open in 2033.”
October 2018 – Uncertainty emerges
Despite the promise to build the northern legs of HS2, it was not guaranteed and a number of politicians called for it to be scrapped. Jacob Rees-Mogg told NCE that the money would be better spent elsewhere. Then foreign secretary Boris Johnson said that other northern transport projects should take precedence over HS2 phase 2.
February 2019 – Stations take shape at suspiciously low price
2019 started more positively for HS2. The first designs for the West London transport super hub Old Oak Common were revealed, with Balfour Beatty Vinci Systra JV named as the construction partner. The deal was for £1bn, a cool £350M lower than forecast.
Summer 2019 – HS2 weathers the storm
With Theresa May ousted from her position as prime minister in May, the Conservative leadership race took flight through the summer – and saw many pelters thrown at HS2 along the way. Out of the main contenders it was only Jeremy Hunt – ironically – who seemed fully committed to delivering the project.
August - September 2019 – Oakervee review
When Boris Johnson came into power he quickly ordered former HS2 Ltd chair Doug Oakervee and Rail Freight Federation chair Lord Berkeley to carry out an independent review into the project after reports that the costs had reached £88bn.
It soon emerged that scrapping the eastern leg of Phase 2 – to take the line to Leeds – was being considered as a recommendation from the Oakervee review. Transport for the North was quick to remind of the benefits that its construction would bring.
November 2019 – Government uncertainty around project
A leaked version of Oakervee’s report included the recommendation that the project go ahead in full. However, Lord Berkeley, who was the deputy chair of the review, wrote an open letter criticising this report, saying it had “serious problems with its lack of balance”.
January 2020 – No clarity
Even after the Conservatives’ landslide win in the general election, they did not provide any clarity on the situation around HS2. The government was warned by the sector that future projects would cost more if HS2 was axed.
February 2020 – Positive news at last
Finally, in February 2020 – alongside the delayed publication of the Oakervee review – the prime minister confirmed that HS2 would go ahead. However, there would be changes to the delivery of HS2 Euston and the northern section was to be repackaged with Northern Powerhouse Rail and “other northern rail projects”. It was also confirmed that timelines would be adjusted.
The industry breathed a sigh of relief at the sign of the green light. The main contractors’ share prices soared.
The government also published its terms of reference for the now-infamous Integrated Rail Plan for the Midlands and the North, which would provide certainty in its plans to invest in the rail network, including HS2, Northern Powerhouse Rail and the Midlands Rail Hub. The government stated that it was “fully committed to providing better rail connectivity between London, the Midlands and the north, ensuring all parts of the country benefit from opportunities for economic development and prosperity”.
The Integrated Rail Plan was promised for publication by the end of 2020.
April 2020 – NTP
The four main contractors on the project were given notice to proceed (NTP) in April.
Amidst a crowd of happy responses, HS2 Ltd CEO Mark Thurston stated: “In these difficult times, today’s announcement represents both an immediate boost to the construction industry - and the many millions of UK jobs that the industry supports - and an important investment in Britain’s future: levelling up the country, improving our transport network and changing the way we travel to help bring down carbon emissions and improve air quality for the next generation.”
However there was still “plenty to do” before construction could officially begin.
May 2020 – More bumps in the road
The positive news of the previous month was tempered in May when the Public Accounts Committee’s update on the project stated that HS2 was “badly off course”, lacking in transparency, low on skills and short on capacity. It was also found that HS2 Ltd’s annual accounts had failed to give an account of the programme’s problems.
Meanwhile, issues around the designs for the Euston tunnels were heard in High Court. A judicial review into the designs was later rejected
September 2020 – Construction officially begins
Having once promised that construction of HS2 would start in 2017, the official commencement of main works was announced in September 2020.
Thurston said: “We are already seeing the benefits that building HS2 is bringing to the UK economy in the short term, but it’s important to emphasise how transformative the railway will be for our country when operational. With the start of construction, the reality of high speed journeys joining up Britain’s biggest cities in the North and Midlands and using that connectivity to help level up the country has just moved a step closer.”
Boris Johnson said: “As the spine of our country’s transport network, the project will be vital in boosting connectivity between our towns and cities.”
October to December 2020 – Fears for Leeds leg re-emerge
However, the lack of any update to the Leeds leg saw concerns sparked that the government was not committed to it. Regional transport bodies urged commitment from the government. Northern Powerhouse Rail director Tim Wood warned of the risks of axing the eastern arm.
January 2021 – No Integrated Rail Plan
The promised Integrated Rail Plan had not emerged by the end of 2020, and questions remained over whether the eastern leg of HS2 would go forward. Transport for the North continued to campaign for its commitment.
This also cast doubt over the future of Northern Powerhouse Rail.
March 2021 – Ups and downs
It wasn’t all sunny – the National Infrastructure Commission continued to press government on clarity around the Leeds leg in the absence of the Integrated Rail Plan.
The first “schedule pressures” on the project also emerged, forcing a change to the timescales.
May 2021 – Queen in on the act
The uncertainty around the Leeds leg of HS2 was ramped up by none other than the Queen in her speech, where she referenced the future of the project but made no mention of the eastern leg. Rail stakeholders again called for clarity.
May 2021 also saw the first HS2 tunnel boring machine (TBM) launched to drive through the Chilterns, while work also got underway at Old Oak Common.
Summer 2021 – Everything’s fine
Despite growing knowledge that the budget for HS2 was spiralling, the DfT stated to the Public Accounts Committee that the project was still going to be delivered within budget. Nevertheless, the DfT set up a team of construction inspectors to keep tabs on HS2 to ensure it stayed on time and on budget.
In July, HS2 Ltd went full steam ahead in launching procurement for Phase 2b, despite uncertainty around what it would look like. Merely days later, HS2 Ltd launched a review of the commercial case for Phase 2b amidst a materials cost crisis.
Publication of the Integrated Rail Plan was again delayed in July.
Speculation around the future of the eastern leg grew again after a Whitehall source told the media that it was to be axed. Once again, the economic and social benefits of the leg were championed by rail experts and stakeholders.
The DfT published a £3.6bn HS2 contracts pipeline only to pull it down within days after realising it was incorrect. Renewed calls for clarity loudly resounded.
October 2021 – The chops begin
In the surest sign yet that the Leeds leg of HS2 would be cut, the transport secretary claimed that it “no longer benefits people”.
October saw confirmation that Euston would be scaled back from 11 platforms to 10.
November 2021 – Integrated Rail Plan brings bad news
The long awaited Integrated Rail Plan was published on 18 November and confirmed that the eastern leg of HS2 would no longer reach Leeds but instead be curtailed in the East Midlands.
The plan also revealed that Northern Powerhouse Rail had been significantly scaled back.
The government championed the plan, saying that it would ensure that the rail upgrades “will be delivered sooner than previous plans so that communities, towns and cities across the North and Midlands are better connected with more frequent, reliable and greener services and faster journey times”.
It promised to launch a £100M study into the best way to bring high speed services to Leeds.
December 2021 – Trains chosen
After a long-running legal battle over the procurement for the trains that will run on the high-speed line, HS2 Ltd finally announced that a Hitachi-Alstom JV would provide the rolling stock in a contract worth around £2bn.
January 2022 – Pressing on with Manchester leg
Leaving the Leeds leg in the rearview, the government commenced the new year by starting the parliamentary process of making HS2 Phase 2b by tabling the hybrid bill.
March 2022 – New Euston
That same month saw the HS2 minister express “concern” as cost pressures on the project rose to £1.7bn.
April 2022 – Golborne link next to go
The first reports that the Golborne link section of the project would be scrapped emerged in April. The Golborne link was a connection between HS2 and the West Coast Main Line that would have added capacity and allowed high speed trains to reach Scotland. Senior Tory MP Sir Graham Brady announced that he had had “categorical, verbal assurances” from Shapps that it would be excised from the plans.
Engineers and stakeholders warned of the value that would be lost by axing the link.
Summer 2022 – Golborne gone
Right up to the day before, government ministers claimed that no decision had been made on the Golborne link, but it was unceremoniously cancelled on 7 June. Cynics claimed that Boris Johnson agreed to the cutting to secure votes in the vote of no confidence against him, which also took place that week.
It was later revealed that £52M had been spent on developing the link before it was axed.
Meanwhile, the Crewe to Manchester hybrid bill passed through its second parliamentary reading. This mean that the petitioning phase would be next and councils in the Manchester area began preparing arguments in favour of changing the bill to provide for an underground through station at Piccadilly.
October-November 2022 – Rumblings
The first rumblings that the HS2 project could be axed emerged this month when Lord Berkeley said that inflation had seen the forecast cost of the project his £155bn. The DfT said there were no plans to cancel.
At the end of the month, levelling up secretary Michael Gove suggested that another funding review of HS2 would possibly be commissioned.
Industry sent a warning to the government ahead of the Autumn Budget when it was feared that cuts to HS2 would be announced, but they did not materialise at this point.
January 2023 – Euston doubts emerge
Early 2023 brought more uncertainty as a report in The Sun revealed that the government was going to make “tough decisions” about HS2. The main one focused around the London terminus at Euston which was rumoured to be delayed or scrapped entirely – which brought vexatious response from the High Speed Rail Group.
February-March 2023 – Euston officially dumped
While these have not (yet) become truth, the rumours around Euston station were solidified in February when transport secretary Mark Harper announced a “re-phasing” of the project by two years. This was decried as a “false economy” by the industry.
Redundancies at the Euston station site started shortly after.
Summer 2023 – Sleeves up to finalise Phase 2b plans
The petitioning phase for the Crewe to Manchester hybrid bill got underway in the summer. Stakeholders of all sorts presented their cases to the select committee in extensive sessions to determine the final scope of the route.
Most pressingly, Manchester authorities banded together to argue the case for an underground through station at Manchester Piccadilly. The debate went on for numerous sessions where a 4-platform version was revealed and the tunnelling case was made. The select committee went away to take their time in making a decision about the future of the station.
In July, another bombshell report – this time from the Public Accounts Committee – slammed the government for its failures in the management of the Euston project, saying it “does not know what it is trying to achieve” with the station.
Nearly two years after it was promised in the Integrated Rail Plan, the government finally published the heads of terms for the £100M study for how to better connect Leeds and Bradford.
September 2023 – End of the line for Phase 2
Just when it seemed like HS2 had settled into its final form, the prime minister and chancellor were found out to be discussing the possibility of scrapping the Birmingham to Manchester leg in the hopes of clawing back some money.
While Rishi Sunak has refused to “speculate on rumours”, his poker face is not the best.
October 2023 - A screeching halt
Dismay was expressed by stakeholders around the country.
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The expected decision needs to recognise that HS2 has a key role as significant as the Motorway Network. The announcement needs to deal with the capacity problems on the West Coast Main Line directly and by identifying capacity enhancing small schemes.
I’m most conscious of inadequate capacity between Rugby and Euston, at Weaver Junction north of Crewe, Piccadilly Station Manchester, Stockport, etc.
The announcement needs to improve governance and give local authorities more influence.
Unfortunately HS2 started with too big a first phase. With hindsight it ought to have started with Marsden to Warrington (the key bit of Northern Powerhouse Core Network and equivalent to the toe in the water M6 Preston, M40 High Wycombe & M4 Slough bypasses).
Better evaluation of the original S shaped network ought to have established its fallback role in case the Eastern Leg, which originally didn’t serve Central Sheffield, Derby & Nottingham, proved too contentious.
It’s interesting that all supporters of HS2 are now pushing the case that it would provide extra capacity for the WCML. Yes it does, but if that was its rationale (which I’d agree with), then why wasn’t it promoted as a conventional multi purpose railway line fully integrated with the rest of the network running 225kph passenger trains across very short distances (in ultra high speed 400kph terms)? The costs would have immediately halved and the railway would have been immensely more useful. And it’s not too late to finish off Phase 1 as such a railway.
HS2’s biggest flaw (apart from its ego-driven design speed) is it’s total incompatibility with the rest of the 16000km network
I agree that politicians and the like see speed as “sexy”. Extra capacity is mundane but that is what is really needed. In providing extra capacity, current fast trains would not get stuck behind slower ones.
This article is useful but doesn’t at all chronicle the chaotic and deceptive approach used by HS2 Ltd to gi estimated costs
Sorry. It would have been a great deal more helpful to have given the insidious rise in cost “estimates” (actually no more than deliberately low guesses) against this timeline. It’s as though the NCE can’t bear to accept that they have backed a project which was based on lies and deception from the very start when there should have been some serious investigative journalism to expose the continuous falsehoods on costs given by HS2 Ltd.
If you have clear evidence that the professionals who have worked on this project for 14years have been guilty of such conduct then you should supply the evidence or withdraw you accusations.
This article appears to have strayed from professional Civil Engineering into party politics.
Already the £36Bn is just being re-packaged onto existing projects some not even in the north or midlands.
What so called planner, engineer or construction expert would draw a colourful line on a white bit of paper then do geological and hydro geological investigations. Local experts working at University level tried to tell the relevant Select Committee before too much public money was committed. Their detailed technical analysis was banned by no other than – HS2. The blame lies with vested interests at HS2 and with the political masters who should have been in control.
The route of HS2 was decided by London-centric politicians who thought that the people of the North would benefit from being able to get to London a few minutes quicker than before. Or near London as it turned out. The plan was that a train full of passengers would stop near London, they would all get off and board another train to go into London, then change again onto the underground.
Better for the people of the Midlands, the North and Scotland would be a high speed line that joins up with HS1 with trains direct to and from the Continent.